Introduction
Many cities throughout the world struggle with the problem of how to rehabilitate urban areas without displacing lower income residents. This paper explores how this question has been addressed within the context of a new wave of urban rehabilitation initiatives operating in Portugal since 2004. Framed by a new institutional framework designed to boost housing requalification 1 , the Urban Requalification Societies (SRU in the has been the existence of socio-spatial inequalities at the local level across several domains (housing, education etc.) , and the need for better cross-sectoral coordination with citizen participation (Skifter-Andersen, 2002) .
A review of the literature on area-based initiatives reveals many criticisms of the adoption of a place-based policy that focuses upon neighbourhoods in a context of rescaling of urban governance and the retreat of the Keynesian state (Musterd & Ostendorf, 2008; Pugalis, 2013) . Among others, there are two main criticisms related to (i) the prioritization of resources: strategies often target issues that are considered less critical (e.g. public space rather than inadequate housing conditions), and (ii) the lack of effectiveness and harmful impacts (e.g. in housing market dynamics and the residential trajectories of lower income families) due to the general policy objectives they promote (Kleinhans, 2012; Kadi & Musterd, 2015; Alves, 2017b) .
The development of area-based initiatives and policies aimed specifically at inner city areas has been a result of urban decay, namely of population loss and building degradation which demand housing improvement and urban renewal. Whilst these strategies have been exercised during the last half century (at least) in most large cities, they have had different starting points (as processes of suburbanization began earlier in central and northern Europe), and diametrically different policy commitments and purposes. In fact, even though the general aim of strategies that targeted the inner city was to improve the physical conditions of historical neighbourhoods, they evolved over time, under different rationales, and on behalf of different stakeholder interests and powers. In this regard, we distinguish a first phase of urban renewal policy that mainly focused upon issues of physical renovation by deploying strategies of slum clearance through the demolition of older and poor quality housing. In reaction to criticisms driven by architectural conservation and the participation of residents (Larsen & In broad terms, 'affordability problems emerge when housing costs increase faster than household incomes' (Yates, 2008: 200) , therefore exceeding what families can afford.
In the debate on the causes and consequences of increasing housing costs across different tenures, Yates (2008) claims that, whilst for purchasers housing costs primarily depend upon the evolution of house prices and interest rates, for tenants in the private rental market they are usually associated with circumstances of high demand that push prices up. Altes (2016) notes the relevance of changes in systems of rent control and tenancy law. Whilst rules that protect tenants from rising rents may result in underinvestment and the misallocation of housing, the deregulation of rent control and tenant protection (against forced relocation) can lead to over-investment in real-estate and housing renewal, tending to displace sitting tenants and leading to gentrification (see also Ponzini, 2016) . The importance of legal constraints is also emphasized by Gorczynska (2017) who, in a case study on transformations of the centre of Warsaw, emphasizes the role of the state in generating different ownership structures and controlling future sales of houses to sitting tenants.
Regarding the debate concerning the threshold level for housing affordability, whilst some claim that an affordable rent is one that should not exceed 40% of the net income of a household (Eurostat, 2015) , others believe that higher housing costs are more problematic for low-income households because they leave them without adequate resources to meet other needs (food, transportation, health services etc.), defining the threshold using the so-called '30/40 rule'. In other words, a threshold stipulating housing costs greater than or equal to 30% of disposable housing income for the lowest two income quintiles, while for income quintiles 3-5 the threshold is set at 40% or more (Dewilde & De Decker, 2014) .
According to Eurostat, in 2015 11.3% of the EU-28 population lived in households that spent more than 40% of their disposable income on housing, with affordability problems being prevalent in Central Eastern and Southern Europe 3 , and for tenants in the private rental sector (Eurostat, 2015) . In Portugal, where the social housing sector is reduced (2%) and the private rental market accommodates around 18% of all Portuguese households, the rate of private rental tenants with housing costs representing more than 40% of their disposable household income was well above the EU-28 average (27%) and saw a more than 17-point increase since 2010, a period of economic crisis when median income values suffered a 5% loss. Problems of housing affordability are especially severe in Porto and Lisbon where, according to the 2011 Census, the rental sector represents 44% and 42% respectively, a share substantially higher than the national average (20%). The importance of specific policies aimed at the private rented sector and, specifically, at urban renewal or rehabilitation targeted at the inner cities is also higher in Lisbon and Porto because these cities still have a considerable stock of housing characterized by old contracts, low rents, and poor housing conditions, typically accommodating sitting tenants with low economic resources who are therefore more exposed to displacement.
Owing to an abrupt transition from a rent freeze to liberalization of the rental market, and expectations of high profitability associated with tourism, over the last decade housing prices have grown rapidly in Lisbon and Porto (official statistics state that rents in Lisbon and Porto city centres rose 19% and 13% respectively in 2016).
In the debate concerning the menu of policy instruments that influence housing affordability, Gurran and Bramley (2017) , who provide a series of international comparative studies that analyse the relationships between housing supply and affordability outcomes (e.g. on the size and quality of the housing stock), claim that, while the main drivers of supply and demand are well understood (housing demand and prices being driven by demographics, incomes, and the availability and cost of credit), there are still elements of uncertainty. For example, on the demand side, the extent to which speculative investment plays a predominant role in the market, creating housing bubbles that as prices rise have a positive rather than a negative feedback effect on demand. On the supply side, the fact that supply changes not only through addition of new buildings but also through conversion and refurbishment. This analysis provides an insight into the challenges in policy design and evaluation in this area.
Urban rehabilitation and governance issues
Problems of urban and housing decay, especially when associated with poverty, social exclusion, and territorial stigmatization, are generally considered to be a complex phenomenon demanding multidimensional and integrated policies. Governments of varying political orientations and ideologies have, however, proposed contrasting approaches to the problem. While left-wing governments have emphasized the importance of a good supply of non-profit housing for all social groups, especially for those unable to achieve acceptable housing conditions by themselves (SkifterAndersen, 2012), right-wing governments have claimed the benefits of entrepreneurialism and the role of the market in replacing bureaucratic and centralized forms of housing provision and rehabilitation (Brenner, Marcuse & Mayer, 2012) .
In contexts in which processes of deregulation, liberalization, and state retrenchment (McKee, 2015) have been implemented, the withdrawal of the state in favour of the private sector and the implementation of forms of 'market renewal' (Pugalis, 2016: 54) have raised several issues regarding the use of public money to pursue market interests.
For example, Glynn (2012), who notes that 'under neoliberalism, the function of governments becomes the facilitation and protection of the market' (Glynn, 2012: 657),
and not the protection of tenants who have relatively few powers, criticizes the overarching strategic framework of market-led initiatives and their social and territorial effects. These processes lead to the displacement of low-income households and the reinforcement of social segregation processes that Pugalis describes as: 'the deepening inequalities between enclaves of the super-rich and those of the extreme poor' (Pugalis, 2016: 59) .
The priorities and allocation of public funds in the context of new models of neoliberal urban governance, in which the participation of the community/voluntary sector is nonexistent or instrumental and in which political leaders attempt to strengthen relationships with the private sector, have been heavily criticized in terms of theory and practice. Fuller (2010) and Pugalis (2016) observe that property-led capitalist solutions have marginalized not only community interests but also local knowledge, political visions, and capabilities. As outlined in the introduction, this paper seeks to scrutinize the implementation of a particular model of neoliberal urban rehabilitation in Lisbon and Porto.
Methodology
The empirical research presented in this paper is based on three main sources of information. First, statistical data analysis which was used to establish a background for the different phases of urban rehabilitation policy, and to follow demographic dynamics and affordability trends. Second, qualitative documentary analysis that involved the study of existing documents, such as pieces of legislation that set the legal framework Two interviews were conducted to test the guidelines and, following this preliminary stage, all nine interviews were digitally recorded with the permission of each interviewee, anonymized, and subsequently transcribed. The guidelines were structured around two main groups of questions, one related to issues of governance, the other to issues of housing affordability. Interviewees were asked to assess the operations developed by SRUs regarding their impacts upon (i) practices of urban governance, namely formal and informal relations between stakeholders within the municipality, across governmental levels, and in the context of public-private partnerships, and (ii) on housing affordability, concerning the impacts of housing rehabilitation on the provision of housing for the less affluent (for example, how local interventions shaped issues of displacement and whether trends of tenurial transformation were associated with housing rehabilitation).
The background of the SRU model of urban rehabilitation

Urban decline in Lisbon and Porto
Whilst the tension between cause and consequence in processes of urban decline is extremely difficult to assess, especially since 'processes of neighbourhood decline are often set in motion by a chain reaction of a combination of social, economic or physical processes' (Zwiers et al., 2014: 4) , in the case of Portugal the association between housing policy and city centre decline is noticeable. As emphasized by Alves (2017c), the problem of urban decline in historic city centres has been related to a set of heterogeneous and interacting factors. On the one hand, the freezing of rents at very low levels from 1948 onwards in Porto and Lisbon removed incentives for landlords to maintain and rehabilitate their properties, while poor maintenance of old buildings facilitated the exodus of well-off families and an influx of poor and unskilled workers.
Thus, as in other countries (Kemp, 2011) , the private rental housing sector is still an important provider of accommodation for low-income households, although it is often of poor quality. On the other hand, housing policies, including subsidized loans and tax incentives, favoured the acquisition of housing (owner-occupancy), leading to a major expansion of new construction in suburban areas (urban sprawl to the peripheries), while efforts at housing rehabilitation remained insufficient in the face of limited funding.
The results of the 2011 Census show that problems of building degradation, ageing population, and vacant buildings are important issues for Porto and Lisbon. Whilst around one million buildings throughout Portugal need repair (4.4% of the total), in
Porto and Lisbon this proportion is even higher, corresponding to 6.9% and 7.4%
respectively (INE, 2011) . The problem of demographic loss and ageing is even more severe in the historic centres of these cities. Between 1991 and 2011, the population of the historic centre of Porto fell by more than 50% to 9334 individuals, while in Lisbon the variation was -34% with around 47,000 inhabitants in 2011 (INE, 2011) . Both cities have a proportion of elderly people well above the national average which, considering the weight of low retirement pensions, adds to social problems of poverty related to poor housing conditions.
The national urban rehabilitation policy background
Several studies (Balsas, 2007; Baptista, 2013 ) use a historical perspective to trace and explain the main phases in the development of housing policy in Portugal vis-à-vis the rehabilitation of the private rented sector and the city centres of Porto and Lisbon, noting that, whilst the list of housing rehabilitation programmes is long, the allocation of resources has been very limited.
As emphasized by Ouwehand and Doff (2013: 115) , 'When we assess a city's policies we have to be aware of where they come from (path dependency)', since normative ideas and socio-economic and historical conditions shape the long-term composition of the housing systems. But it is also important to understand the main features of the political system where these systems are implemented as they affect practices of city governance. In this regard, we should note that:
(1) Portugal is a highly centralized unitary state (Michalski, 2012) resulting from the liberalization of the rental market has had several adverse consequences for the middle class and the most vulnerable groups. In the meantime, the current left-wing government has increased the transition period by another five years and recently announced several programmes aimed at increasing the provision of 'affordable' housing, both for tenants and first-time buyers. Whilst many issues remain unclear, namely how much public funding will be allocated and the timeline for implementation, it is obvious that there is a growing emphasis on new provision of a stock of 'below-market housing' primarily through market mechanisms.
Empirical analysis and results
In this section we reflect on the empirical data collected for the purpose of this research (see the prior section on methodology for details). First, we present the framework for the implementation of the SRU model and analyse its policy instruments, regarding the powers conferred by its specific legal framework and regarding the main funding sources available for their actions. Second, we scrutinize the implementation on the ground of SRUs in Porto and Lisbon, taking into consideration: (i) the political context which led to their creation; (ii) the strategic documents which guided their actions, and (iii) the general characteristics and impacts of concrete projects that were carried out.
Finally, we discuss the qualitative information provided by interviews with staff and representatives of public entities involved in SRU projects, which have given us valuable insights into both subjective and objective issues that complement the formal evaluation of SRU projects.
Urban Rehabilitation Societies: legal and financial framework
Urban Rehabilitation Societies are an institutional arrangement based on the premise that local authorities need a lighter structure of governance and -if justified -a partnership with national authorities and private actors to tackle the rehabilitation of urban centres. This approach is not new in urban public policy (see Baptista, 2013) , but for the first time the central role has been given to the municipalities.
The Urban Rehabilitation Law (legal decree no. 103/2004) created two institutional models for these societies, one in which the municipalities hold all the capital, and another in which societies obtain capital from the municipality and the central state, the latter made available by IHRU. The second model was implemented only in Porto, Coimbra, and Viseu, all of which remain active to date. Interest in the municipal initiative model was more widespread, but many SRUs were dismantled during this period, as local authorities struggled with implementation. There were two reasons for this. First, the central government's imposition of budget constraints and regulations forced municipalities to incorporate the deficits and bank loans of municipally owned companies, and second, in 2012 the approval of legislation that stipulates the end of municipal companies that are not financially sustainable.
As local agencies, SRUs are meant to work in close cooperation with municipalities and the central state, but they enjoy substantial freedom to define their strategy. On the one hand, the legislation attributes to either SRUs or municipalities the competence to rehabilitate within the priority areas of intervention delimited by them (the so-called Urban Rehabilitation Areas -ARU in the Portuguese acronym). On the other hand, the central state has not defined the substantive issues of the strategic documents that guide intervention on the ground, therefore transferring the responsibility of coordinating and ranking the various goals of urban rehabilitation from the strategic to the operational stages.
SRUs have wide legal powers, namely to expropriate or force the sale of buildings that are in a poor state of repair with the aim of promoting their rehabilitation. However, the law stipulates that such power should be used only when all other options have been exhausted, as it is clearly stated that the role of the SRU is primarily to enforce the duty to perform repairs.
On the other hand, the non-profit corporate status of the SRU model makes it easier to employ staff and contract commercial loans, and to implement faster licencing procedures, allegedly improving the cost effectiveness of urban rehabilitation by the private sector. Regarding the funding schemes available for SRUs in this period, and specifically related to urban rehabilitation operations, the main programmes are identified in Table   1 . The European Bank of Investment (EIB) has been one of the most relevant funding sources, namely through the first credit line to be managed by IHRU, which was signed In 2013 a new financial instrument using funds from the EIB was launched by IHRU.
The programme, known as Rehabilitate to Rent, 4 is aimed at the rehabilitation of buildings totally or partially occupied by sitting tenants who benefit from old contracts associated with low rents. It has a budget of around €50 million and aims to induce both housing rehabilitation and affordable rents. The latest instrument deployed, the IFFRU 2020, which was effectively launched on the ground only in 2017, has a substantially higher capacity, but includes no positive discrimination of housing or affordability criteria. 
The implementation of the SRU in Lisbon
In 2004 investment of €7.6 million, 3.5 million of which was provided by EU Cohesion Funds and leveraged a strong rehabilitation trend in one of the most dilapidated areas of the city centre, which is now under strong gentrification pressure. Due to its location next to the monumental area, the Mouraria neighbourhood has attracted investment in both tourist accommodation and large rehabilitation operations (where whole quarters are renovated for luxury housing) which has created strong resistance from local residents and ONGs and has forced the municipality to step in and negotiate with investors. 
SRU intervention: interview results
In the following pages, we present the main findings of the interviews. The data collected was organized according to the two main research questions of the paper, as described in the methodology section.
Regarding the issue of governance, we scrutinize the local implementation of the SRU model by focusing upon the vertical coordination of public institutions and horizontal coordination between the public and private spheres, bearing in mind that the SRU model was created as a vehicle for the delivery of private-public partnerships, therefore could have a strong potential impact on local governance.
Concerning housing affordability, we look at the contribution of SRU strategies to the provision of affordable housing and the perceived impacts of housing rehabilitation operations on housing market prices, housing tenure transformation, and the socioeconomic profile of new residents.
Governance issues of SRU implementation
Regarding vertical coordination among public sector organizations, interviews reveal that the SRU institutional framework has not contributed to the creation of a wellarticulated and collective strategic vision. Even in the case of Porto, where the central state held the majority of SRU capital, the definition of the strategy followed top-down methodologies, being decided by the mayor and president of the SRU and implemented by the technical staff. Interviewees also agreed that the definition of strategies and approaches to urban renewal is a task for local governments. As stated by a Porto Vivo SRU representative:
The [central] State should participate in the SRU. Participate and be active and cooperative […] in terms of policy, I have no doubt that we must follow and adapt to municipal policy for the planning of each municipality's territory.
However, central government officials criticized local actors for their lack of accountability regarding investment options or the rationality of the more onerous investments in a number of quarters. The following excerpt from an interview with one IHRU representative illustrates the lack of collaboration that existed over time between
Porto Vivo SRU and IHRU:
The SRU that I found was very attached to the municipality. Although the Institute [IHRU] was the main owner, with 60%, and the municipality had 40%, it was very aligned with the municipality, in fact.
[…] When things arrive at the owner's desk, they already come with a 'package.' In Lisbon, where there has been total subordination to the policy options of the municipality, the lack of participation by the central state is not viewed by SRU officials as a limitation to vertical cooperation. As stated by one interviewee, as a governance structure separate from the municipality, Lisboa Ocidental SRU relates to the municipalities through the political sphere, with few links existing between related technical services of both institutions. For example, the creation of three SRUs in Lisbon was attributed in interviews to a decision by the mayor which was viewed with distrust by municipal staff owing to institutional complexity, the extra costs that would be incurred, and the fear of giving away power to a less scrutinized stakeholder.
In the case of Porto, various interviewees attested that the municipality pushed for the creation of an SRU with central government participation and that the transfer of all competencies related to urban rehabilitation in the city centre was a decision taken at the top political level. The strong alignment between municipality and Porto Vivo SRU was shaken by the election of a new mayor in 2013. The new municipal authorities were very critical of SRU strategies and interventions, which was apparent throughout the election campaign. At the time of the interviews, municipality officials strongly objected to the SRU's alleged lack of transparency and even stated that management information was not passed to the municipality.
In Porto the SRU and municipality are two stakeholders with similar power (the SRU prevailing to some extent owing to its autonomy). In Lisbon the SRU is part of a mode of governance of rehabilitation policy in which the municipality is clearly dominant.
The Lisboa Ocidental SRU was created prior to the current strategy for urban rehabilitation and, whilst evaluation of its work by the interviewees is very positive, there seems to be no intention of replicating the model. According to a member of the municipality staff:
It would be a return to the past, because nowadays the action of the municipality is totally different. All the area is a rehabilitation area and we cannot have decentralized units everywhere.
[…] It is unthinkable.
Focusing upon horizontal coordination between the public and private sphere, it is worth noting that for both SRUs the main aim was to attract private investment for urban rehabilitation areas. In the words of an official from the Porto Vivo SRU, the SRU plays a neutral role in the implementation of the projects: 'it serves as a mere instrument to expropriate the properties which were not in the private partners' possession so that he could execute the works.'
Statements from Porto Vivo SRU representatives show that there is also great flexibility regarding strategies and goals for the intervention areas, in favour of private investors'
interests:
The owner can bring ideas into the project or an investor can appear who is not the original owner and has a given project in mind and all this is flexible. We have changed various situations according to market dynamics.
The risks of these large-scale operations with strong private investor involvement are well represented in the Cardosas operation, in which the costs incurred by the SRU were underestimated and housing sales did not cover them. Under fire from both central state and municipality, Porto Vivo SRU officials state that their strategy to avoid this risk is to choose smaller projects and define partnership conditions with greater caution, the overall aim being to improve financial sustainability.
From the start, in Lisboa Ocidental SRU there was a preference for small and manageable housing projects aimed at local owners. SRU staff mentioned that intervention units were deliberately small so that strategic documents and intervention management was simplified. Representatives of Lisboa Ocidental SRU also stated that this small-scale approach allowed for flexible solutions and close scrutiny of the processes, giving concrete examples: 'we had one building that we rehabilitated directly, and the tenant re-located with his own means. He found a solution, we did everything in agreement, we rehabilitated and then he returned.'
Housing affordability, tenure changes, and socio-economic composition
Interviewees unanimously claimed that the main purpose of the SRU is not housing provision but rather the rehabilitation of public spaces and public buildings, and the facilitation of private investment in rehabilitation by cutting back bureaucracy and supporting projects (for example, the temporary rehousing of sitting tenants).
The arguments in favour of focusing upon public space to the detriment of an active housing policy drew upon the same reasoning across all interviews, by combining issues of jurisdiction (the public space is an arena where public intervention is crucial while rehabilitation is a legal obligation of all owners), and practical considerations (it is cheaper and easier to implement). In the words of an SRU representative: Interviewees also pointed out the clear division of tasks that has existed concerning housing. SRUs are responsible for promoting rehabilitation and, when formal contracts of rehabilitation are signed with private sector actors, municipal services are responsible for rehousing these families on social housing estates. At the time of writing, Porto
Vivo SRU has announced that 28 apartments will be available for rent in the Morro da Sé neighbourhood, stating that priority will be given to landlords who own real-estate in the historic centre or in intervention units with approved strategic documents for the relocation of their tenants during rehabilitation works. Whilst it is still unclear who will have access to apartments, it is apparent that the SRU is not bringing back low-income families who were displaced from the city centre in previous decades and relocated in peripheral social housing estates. In the Lisboa Ocidental SRU area, directly promoted rehabilitation was mainly implemented in vacant buildings, with very few temporary relocations.
When reviewing the structure of usage in rehabilitated areas, interviewees pointed out Regarding investment flows in the intervention area, the prevailing view of Porto Vivo SRU staff is that tourism is a catalyst of rehabilitation which cannot be dismissed, even when an expected increase raises political concerns.
In terms of change to the housing stock in rehabilitated buildings, both SRUs state that they aim to create a cycle of investment in commercial housing leveraged by public actors. This approach has clearly benefitted new dynamics in real-estate investment, most of them generated by external investors who have transformed the local housing markets. As a Porto Vivo SRU representative stated:
owners are the first to thank for the existence of Porto Vivo SRU […] We have great demand from people who had never been here, who never owned a building here, those are the promoters who are appearing, many of whom are foreigners who want to invest here.
Housing directly rehabilitated by SRUs and provided for rent in the private sector was not directed at specific groups (according to age, family income, or prior residency in a given area). As a result, it did not contribute to solving problems of affordability in the area as rent values were only slightly below the area's market prices, which supports the claim that the SRU's commitment to affordability was insufficient.
Discussion
Projects of urban requalification are highly complex as they involve multiple actors and interests to counteract processes of urban decline. In the cases of Lisbon and Porto, processes of physical, economic, and social decline of historic districts have been inseparable from the freezing of rents at very low levels, removing incentives for landlords to maintain and rehabilitate their properties. All of which have led to poor housing conditions for sitting tenants and urban sprawl.
Statistical data demonstrates that representatives of the public sector at various levels of decision-making have been unable to halt the long-term demographic decline and ageing of Lisbon and Porto, especially in their historic centres. As mentioned, the decline in the population of the historic centres of these cities and its physical degradation demonstrate the need for more collaboration with the private sector and landowners, such as in the facilitation of building approvals and fiscal and financial incentives. Within a society highly polarized by economic and political inequalities, the new practices of entrepreneurial governance did not tackle problems of housing affordability but, by fostering real-estate speculation, increased socio-spatial polarization, especially in Porto, leading to the concentration of tourism activities in specific parts of the city and the relocation of a population with fewer economic and educational resources elsewhere (Alves, 2017c).
The use of public resources to promote costly rehabilitation operations and produce luxury housing condominiums that only the upper-middle class can afford has raised criticisms and concerns regarding the lack of transparency and de-regulation enabled by market-oriented development practices. More recently, the housing boom has attracted strong media attention which now increasingly focuses upon the unsustainable nature of the growth in housing prices.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to fill a gap in empirical research into the role of new urban rehabilitation agencies (SRUs), based on the cases of Porto and Lisbon. The paper contributes to understanding how this new model, driven by entrepreneurial public practices and a market-oriented rehabilitation approach have affected governance practices in both cities, and increased housing prices, raising concerns about the needs of a less affluent local population affected by the interventions.
In terms of the governance impact, the empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that the lack of cooperation between these new institutions and formal government structures has led to a redistribution of powers, competencies, and responsibilities without adequate mechanisms or instruments to enforce accountability and to measure how objectives are being met. In the name of greater flexibility and independence, these new institutions, emerging from cooperation between local and central actors, have actively supported private actors' interests and, in the context of formal partnerships not involving third sector partners, have adapted their strategies to the profit-driven goals of the private sector. However, despite the rhetoric of market-led investment, the leading role played by the SRU in several systematic operations assumed risks that produced deficits for the public sector, while generating lucrative results for private investors.
By targeting costly developments in geographically circumscribed areas, allegedly to generate positive trickle-down effects in neighbouring areas, the actions of SRUs have led to increased real-estate prices in areas suitable for tourism, which has resulted in speculative housing prices. Evidence shows that rent markets are becoming unsustainable for the middle-class despite the definition of 're-inhabiting' as a priority goal of intervention by both the municipalities of Lisbon and Porto and the Portuguese government (IHRU, 2015) .
As emphasized by Mendes and Carmo (2016), Tulumello (2016) , and Alves (2017c), urban policy in Lisbon and Porto demonstrate a public sector in favour of private investment and privatization of council housing stock, which is driving real-estate refurbishment towards big investors and the tourism industry.
It is crucial that housing and rehabilitation policies in Portugal set more progressive and redistributive agendas, taking into account issues of financial sustainability and housing affordability. Instruments such as setting an upper limit for building costs and implementing a cost-related formula to set rents would be interesting options while housing allowances would enable tenants to afford refurbished dwellings.
The current cycle of expansion in property development and housing markets is arguably generating increased revenues for private investors, but there is little sign that public authorities are using the increasing tax revenues to address affordability policy goals.
In this context, it is important to emphasize three general recommendations drawn from the comparative analysis of these two case studies. First, housing and rehabilitation policies should not support real-estate speculation, gentrification, and the displacement of tenants but should rather focus upon the eradication of poor housing by non-profit housing associations. Second, the public sector should better regulate housing and rehabilitation policies that involve price instruments (namely taxation and subsidies) and infrastructure provision, requiring in each operation a mix of housing types/tenures and of families (in respect of income, age structures, composition etc.). And, finally, as has been practised in other countries (Karadimitriou et al., 2013) , in exchange for securing sites and obtaining planning and statutory consents, public officials should encourage private and non-profit investors to employ a percentage of their investment to produce affordable housing for middle and low-income populations. The delivery of non-market housing in operations of housing requalification would be beneficial in a buoyant market as in the cases of Porto and Lisbon where price boom/bust cycles have increased social and spatial inequality.
